

<u>Factions</u>	<u>Supporters</u>	<u>Stance on Succession</u>	<u>Role of Clerics</u>	<u>Views on War</u>	<u>View of US/USSR</u>
<u>RADICALS</u>					
1) Prime Minister Musavi 2) Revolutionary Guard Commander Rezai 3) Revolutionary Guard Minister Rafiq-Dust 4) Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholeslam 5) State Prosecutor Hujjat ol-Islam Khoiniha	Revolutionary Guard Revolutionary Committees Cabinet Friday Prayer Leaders Urban lower class	Unhappy with Ayatollah Montazeri's* moderate stance on key issues over last two years. Probably will push for leadership council which radicals would hope to control.	Radical clerics favor tight clerical control. Many non-clerical radicals would eventually like to push clerics out of government	Most favor continuing war until Saddam and Ba'th party toppled.	Anti-Soviet but see US as greatest threat.
<u>MODERATE/CONSERVATIVE</u>					
1) Deputy speakers of Majles Hojjat ol-Islam Yazdi and Ayatollah Azari-Qomi 2) Supreme Court Head Ardabili 3) Ayatollah Mirdavi Kani 4) Grand Ayatollahs Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi	Majles (parliament) Senior clerics in Qom Local clerics Bazaar Merchants Army	Generally oppose Ayatollah Montazeri as lacking religious credentials; also oppose Khomeini's view that supreme cleric should supervise the government.	Moderates generally favor loose clerical supervision. Conservatives favor limited clerical role, believe clerics should provide only general guidance.	Many privately favor negotiated end to war.	Most anti-Soviet group; suspicious of US, but probably favor improvement over long- term.
<u>PRAGMATISTS**</u>					
1) Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani 2) President Khomeini 3) Ayatollah Montazeri 4) Ayatollah Meshkini	Majles Revolutionary Guard Government bureaucracy Army	Some back Montazeri, others favor a leadership council, depending on which they believe serves their interests.	Favor tight clerical control.	Rafsanjani favors launching another offensive-prominent role in directing the war. Khomeini favors winding down the war, rebuilding economy. Montazeri may have recently shifted to Khomeini's position.	Some pragmatists—in particular Rafsanjani— probably see benefits from rapprochement with US and USSR but lack authority or political support to initiate move

*Khomeini's designated successor

**Pragmatists maneuver opportunistically between the two other factions, choosing policies they believe further their own careers and Iran's national interests.